At this point, the beginning of the third millennium in the Gregorian calendar, it seems customarily assumed that several epochs of globalization have occurred to shape the world as 1 we perceive it today. In these periods, a complex series of changes closely intertwined develop into an increasing interdependence and interaction between people and human organizations in disparate locations of the world. These changes, when structural, are in a great part of economic nature, markets becoming natural mediators of globalization forces 1 .
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In terms of trade 2 , there is still controversy whether the last globalization waves, the first roughly identified from 1870 till the beginning of World War I and the second from 1960 to the present, are more different than similar 3 -there is no a complete agreement either whether a third middle wave has occurred 4 . The two waves correspond to processes of decolonization and falls of technical barriers with the corresponding downloads of costs and time expenditures.
The first wave was triggered by the Industrial Revolution, with steam power spoiling the expanding of railroad networks and oceanic routes and the telegraph connecting the two sides of the Atlantic. The second came intimately related to the Information Technologies Revolution, communications costs dramatically dropping at the same time that information management capabilities explode. In gross terms, the first globalization burst had to do with lower costs in transportation of materials and goods, while the second deals with exchange of information and ideas. Two different natures of changes that may well produce different impacts.
This discussion brings directly to the problem of how to measure globalization. Quantitative approaches could enlighten but have been timid to this moment, most works adopting analytical methodologies. New quantitative ways of studying globalization processes are required to exploit the wealth of information in historical data 5, 6 . One simple step forward consists in complementing the study of aggregated or global values with the statistical analysis of how they are distributed, from where we can obtain not only more detailed but also new information. For instance, a prominent figure when measuring globalization of trade plots the evolution in time of total international trade as a percentage of the global product, computed as the sum of all national gross domestic products (GDPs). As it has been reported by several authors 3, 4, 7 , an U-shape pattern emerges, with rise of trade in the two eras of globalization and a major reversal in between, and has been claimed as a common trait which recurs in many other empirical analysis, such as in the plot of global capital flows to GDP ratios or in the correlation between savings and investment 3, 8 .
Still We used historical national import/export data from two different databases, DBI 9,10 (1870-1992) and DBII 11,12 (1948-2000) . World GDP historical values are more difficult to obtain.
Despite its role as a major instrument of economic policy in virtually all countries in the world, it is indeed a twentieth century concept as the rest of the national income accounts and GDP data were not collected or even defined before the 1930s. In our graphs, GDP data come from a third source 13, 14 . The bilateral trade flux F between two countries is computed as the net money flow from one to the other due to trade exchanges. In Fig. 1 , the time evolution of the global GDP is compared to that of the average bilateral trade flow. Both evolutions seem decoupled until the 60's. From 1870 to that date, and without taking into account war periods, the average imbalance remains fluctuating around a constant level, in contrast to the estimation for the global GDP, which appreciably grows. Afterwards, they couple and follow similar growing patterns. This seems indicative of a change of behavior or transition. In Fig. 2 , we present the complementary cumulative probability distribution of net trade flows between pairs of countries for several different years since 1870. The curves are measuring the probability that a trade imbalance between two countries in the trade system is bigger than a certain amount, and the cumulative evaluation offers the advantage of filtering out the statistical noise due to the finite sizes of the samples without loosing information about the distribution. The first to observe is that, in good approximation, all the curves overlap between the years 1870 and 1960, see We see that the master curve, and indeed every distribution, is lognormal -they can be thought of as the multiplicative product of many small independent factors-, again an ubiquitous shape in economics. The collapse that it represents implies that the system is self-similar with respect to the characteristic scale given by the GDP. That means that the widening of the distributions in time is just a dilatation driven by the increase in total GDP and the same curve is found once the GDP growth is discounted. Until new structural changes impact the world trade system, we can assume that this behavior will be preserved through time so that, by taking into account global GDP projection values, we can predict the statistical distribution of bilateral trade imbalances that would correspond to future periods.
To understand better how GDP and trade imbalances are related, the empirically successful gravity model of international trade can be revisited 15 . In its basic form, it predicts bilateral trade flows based on a functional form that is reminiscent of the law of gravity in physics, and involves the distance between pairs of countries and their economic masses, estimated in first 4 instance as their GDP. Thus, bilateral trade imbalances seem to be empirically dictated in part by the GDP values of the countries concerned. On the other hand, the aggregated value of all bilateral trade flows for a certain country affects in its turn GDP levels. The GDP of a country is defined as the market value of all final goods and services produced within its borders in a given period of time. In the expenditure-based approach, it is decomposed in several terms as
, where C(t) stands for private consumption, I(t) for business investments in capital, G(t) for government spending, and F (t) stands for net trade balance. So, internal contributions are corrected by the trade interactions with other countries.
The sudden transition in the 60's that ties from that moment on the evolution of the statistical distribution of net trade flows to that of the global GDP seems to suggest that the internal com- 
